“WATCHOUTS & LOOKOUTS” FOR STRUCTURAL FIRES: Part One

This excerpt introduces the reader to ‘Lookouts’ and structural firefighting safety.

The development of the "10 Standard Fire Orders" and the "18 Watch out Situations" for wild land fire fighting was an attempt to reduce the incidence of firefighter injury and death. As a safety document these two lists have become part of the basic training of wild land fire fighters across the country. It has proven its value to the safety of men and women working fire lines when these recommendations have been applied.

There is a movement to extrapolate the concept of these lists into the world of structural fire fighting. The concept of examining how fire fighters are being killed and injured and applying that information into a simplified format has resulted in the list known as the “Watch outs and Look outs for Structural Firefighting. While the initial thrust of this movement has its roots in the Los Angeles Fire Department, all of the information contained within these lists of structural firefighting look outs and watch outs can be found within the NIOSH fatality investigation files.

The accident summaries suggest that there are seven common factors that can be identified as contributors to the majority of injuries and deaths in the Fire Service.

These factors are classified under the categories of: Lookouts, Location, Communication, Conditions, Escape, Safety Zones, and Safety Equipment.

These accident summaries further suggest that there are three common denominators found in every firefighter accident and death. Those three factors involve:

• The positioning of personnel on an emergency scene in relation to the threat imposed upon them.
• The incident conditions presented to responders as they operate on the scene of an emergency.
• The improper use of, or failure to utilize the proper protective equipment required for a specific set of tasks.

Let's examine the seven common factors that contribute to firefighter injuries and death in more detail.

1. ‘Lookouts’
There are specific risks associated with specific tasks on an emergency scene.
In addition, the size and severity of each event will influence the degree of risk faced by emergency personnel.

There is evidence to support the suggestion that harmful events may be predictable.

Based upon recognition that certain harmful events produce warning signs the concept of ‘lookouts’ lists have been developed for a number of areas including wild-land firefighting, hazardous materials response, traffic scene safety and structural firefighting.

Lookouts are defined as events that should not be ignored.

The Firefighter, Fire Officer, or Incident Commander should make a conscious effort to evaluate the emergency scene with an eye to observing the bigger picture.

That ‘big picture’ evaluation of an incident includes the size-up of immediate concerns, an estimation of potential problems that cannot be seen, and the assessment of the immediate surroundings. The bigger picture of an incident includes all of the peripheral issues that surround the primary focus of initial control efforts. The big picture includes an assessment of what is not visible from the street.

The effort taken to conduct this assessment places the Incident Commander in a better position to forecast fire behavior as it relates to firefighter safety and accountability.
One of the considerations that must be assessed is the issue of structural stability. Structural failure can be defined as a failure of any single building component due to age, deterioration, fire, or other damaging effect.

NIOSH has identified a number of reliable indicators of impending or potential structural failure. They include:

• · The size and location of the fire within the structure. The size of the fire upon the arrival of the first resource should offer significant clues as to the future stability of a structure. A large fire in the basement of an older masonry building, or heavy black smoke chugging out of a the attic space of Micky-D’s are both examples of serious fire behavior. Both situations require careful analysis of the type of event transpiring and the event effects on the particular structure. Each type of construction has its inherent weak points. The location of the fire within the structure as well as that structures ability to withstand the force of gravity require a careful assessment from the first arriving officer. It is important that the first arriving officers have an understanding of building construction and the effects of fire upon it.
• · The length of time the fire has been attacking the supporting structural elements. From the moment that flame contacts the structural pieces that hold a building together, the building is ‘falling down’. It is the responsibility of the Incident Commander to estimate how much ‘safe’ time is left to conduct interior firefighting operations. That is a hard thing to do. Part of the problem lies in the fact that without adequate alarm notification, there is a period of time that we may not be able to track. That is the time from fire inception to fire discovery. That is one of the reasons that lightweight construction is so unforgiving. There is no ‘safe’ amount of time to suppress fire in lightweight construction. Not understanding how these types of buildings are put together, or degrade, makes interior operations a crapshoot.
• · The fire conditions upon arrival of the first company. The extent of fire development within a structure and the rate at which it spreads are important clues in estimating your ability to successfully interrupt the expected sequence of events. When you consider that ‘pressure’ developed within a structure (by fire), is the most consistent predictor of fire spread, it is important for company officers to be able to visualize where the fire is ‘now’ and where it will become evident next. Knowing that vent pipes in an apartment building pass through bathrooms will provide the fire officer with clues to predict fire spread. Lightweight construction that presents heavy smoke and fire conditions may provide significant indication of early component failure.
  · The size, type, and configuration of the building play a part in this evaluation process. The size of a building may not directly indicate conditions ripe for collapse, but the building size is a factor of lightweight design. The incorporation of long spans should factor into the fire officer’s evaluation of the potential for early and total collapse.
• Large structures of masonry composition depend upon the combined effect of gravity and structural design to remain upright. Destruction of significant structural members may result in catastrophic destabilization of the building. They are stiff and brittle and don’t flex real well.
• The fire officer should pay particular attention to the establishment and enforcement of collapse zones when preparing for the possibility of building collapse.
• Large buildings that cover large areas of real estate and incorporate multiple floors present issues related to access into the seat of the fire. Time, distance and obstacles all need to be assessed in making plans to attack fires inside of large structures. Imagine what was going through the mind of the Incident Commander at the Wooster cold storage fire when he stood at the door and told his people that no else was going inside of the structure. He had people lost inside of this huge masonry structure and there was no safe means of retrieving them. The size of the occupancy does play a role in crew safety.
• The size of the building will have an impact on the ability to retrieve people should a ‘withdrawal’ or ‘abandonment’ procedure be come necessary.
• If it is hard to ‘get in’, it will be hard to get out.

• · The presence of combustible materials, load distribution and the presence or absence of fire suppression systems in the structure has an impact on collapse prediction. The higher or taller a structure, the greater the likelihood that it will incorporate components that have a lower resistance to the effects of heat and flame.
  As seen in the Trade Center, the failure of a relatively small portion of the building precipitated a total collapse. In order to reach the heights that the building designers intended the interrelated building components and the means of fastening them together left little margin for safety. The failure of the corners initiated a total collapse. Lessons learned from the WTC and other building collapses must be applied to future structural events to increase the margin of safety for emergency responders and the public.
• · Evaluation of the relative age of a structure, as well as the evidence of renovation or alteration should be evaluated. The age of a building can provide clues to estimate its stability under fire conditions. Contemporary construction methods are inherently suspect. The type of construction, the design and the materials used should be studied for clues to behavior under fire. Development of pre-incident action plans will assist the fire officer and increase the margin of safety for firefighters.
• Older buildings and buildings in states of deterioration from neglect are more likely to suffer greater damage from fire. Due to this fact, they may present a higher risk for structural failure and collapse. Floor systems, stairways, parapets, porches and awnings are examples of features of structures that may fail without warning due to the combined effect of age and structural deterioration.
• As a factor in the early collapse of buildings, renovations and alterations rank at the top. The collapse of the floor at the ‘Mary Pang’ warehouse fire in Seattle is tied directly to the failure of a pony wall incorporated into an alteration made many years prior to the fire. In addition, the addition of concrete over this floor added weight that would eventually play a role in the death of four firefighters when the collapse of the pony wall preceded a complete failure of the floor.
• · The presence of combustible materials. The presence and amounts of combustible materials within a structure is a factor in predicting the speed of fire development and early structural failure. High fuel loading increases the magnitude of the fire. Higher heat output coupled with accelerated or sustained fire growth can rapidly weaken support elements in the building.
  It is important for the fire department to conduct regular inspections and to maintain a system of ‘pre-incident actions plans’ based upon thorough pre-fire assessments of all occupancies identified as ‘high’ risk.
• · The type of occupancy. The activities that take place inside of a building will have an impact on relative structural stability under fire conditions. A fire inside of an auto part store loaded with flammable liquid containers will behave in a manner quite different from a single-family wood frame dwelling loaded with furniture.
  
  · Histories of fires, prolonged vacancy or abandonment with exposure to the elements are important items to evaluate in predicting premature collapse. Evidence that a structure has sustained damage from previous fires should be an indication to the fire officer that it is likely that the structure is unsafe for interior firefighting operations.

Indications that a building has been open to the elements for any period of time should cause the fire officer to carefully evaluate the need for sustained interior operations.

Damaged or weakened structural components, floors and roof, the lack of or absence of fire stops and the presence of holes increase the likelihood that collapse may occur suddenly and unexpectedly.

Activities associated with interior fire operations should only address life preservation and rescue issues.

Station officers should become familiar with the structures in their areas that fit the definition of abandoned or ‘rotten’ structures. Evidence of habitation should be noted. Efforts to dismantle or tear down dangerous buildings should be part of a departmental pre-incident mitigation plan.

• · The presence of supported loading. The loading attributed to the structure should be factored into any prediction of building failure. Whether it is in the form of HVAC on top of a lightweight roof, or concrete added to a warehouse floor, the water from hose lines, or the weight of several firefighters on top of a fire damaged floor, supported loads factor into the collapse sequence. The images of four Phoenix firefighters falling through a lightweight roof covered with tile underscores the unexpected aspect of structural failure.
• · The production of smoke and presence of exposure buildings. Smoke production at a fire may indicate rapid destruction of the supporting members of a building. Thick black or brown smoke pushing or pulsing out of a fire building is a sign of dramatic interior change. Consider for a minute the presence of brown smoke out of the eaves of a lightweight truss roof system. What that smoke should be telling us is ‘WATCHOUT’ for the collapse of the system. The area underneath the shingles is nothing more than a stapled lumberyard.

Smoke can conceal problems with the building.

• · Roof operations conducted under conditions of heavy smoke may prevent the fire officer from observing visual clues of impending collapse.
• · Smoke that reduces the visibility inside of a building can hide holes, weakened floors and damage stairways. All of which can become traps for firefighters.
• · Smoke that obscures cracks in walls, sagging facades or walls can increase the risk to firefighters working on the street.

Secondary collapse caused by the failure of the fire building into the upper floors of adjacent buildings should be a consideration when estimating collapse zones.

Fires in occupancies that pose a risk of explosive structural failure should be evaluated for their potential impact on surrounding exposures.

• Other factors that must be included in any stability assessment include resource availability, experience and expertise. The ability and availability of resources to conduct fire operations must be factored in the stability assessment. The lack of proper resources may delay access to and control of fires inside of the structure. This delay may the difference between successful control and unmitigated disaster. Fire officers must weigh the requirements for containment and control of the fire and the availability of just the right kind and amount of resources. Even then, it just might not be enough to get the job done.

One of the factors associated with firefighter fatalities and injuries lie in the absence or infrequency of incident action plan reassessments. An understanding of target hazards, typical construction and high-risk occupancies will increase the margin of safety.

· Other factors: time of day, weather conditions… Snow loading, water trapped behind clogged drains can add additional weather related weight to an already stressed support system.

Delayed arrival due to traffic or icy roads can be enough of a factor to reduce safety margins already minimized by light construction or delayed notification.

Departments subject to manpower fluctuations during certain hours of the day must adjust incident action plans to conform to reductions in force.

Another influence on increased risk is the reliance upon habitual response behaviors. Complacent expectation that certain behaviors will produce reliable results has been a factor in killing firefighters.

Fire officers must learn to engage in methodical, thoughtful approaches to solving problems based upon the evaluation and availability of resources.

Smoke Signals…
The ability to predict fire spread and smoke travel is an art. If the Incident Commander understands the effects of pressure generated under fire conditions, and the assessment of smoke, they will be in a better position to forecast the next step in the progression of fire through the structure.

Pressure, generated through the development of the fire, is the single most critical consideration in predicting fire spread in a structure.

If the Incident Commander can “visualize” how the development of pressure assists in the movement of heat, unburned fire gases, and smoke throughout a structure, they will be better equipped to make predictions about what may occur next. That ability to forecast the next fire event will enhance fire ground safety.

For example, changes in fire behavior may be preceded by changes in smoke color, volume and pressure. Smoke that is being drawn into and forced out of a structure or even sudden expansion of fire gases at building openings are indications of change within a structure that should not be ignored.

Steps need to be taken to alleviate and compensate for changes in smoke and fire behaviors. Proper response to these sudden changes may provide the margin of safety that prevents firefighters from being trapped within a structure.

Complacency kills.
Routine events have killed complacent firefighters. There are any numbers of stories where ‘routine’ fires have resulted in catastrophe. A recent tragedy in Oregon began where crews encountered a seemingly small routine fire. In this instance it rapidly developed into an event that they had not anticipated, and were not prepared to address. The result was three widows and a number of orphans.

We have a responsibility to ourselves, our personnel and to our customers to forecast fire events in a manner that maximizes our ability to react to changes in the fire environment. Safety is a team activity.

• Anticipation and meaningful reaction to changing conditions should be the focus of all personnel on the scene. Safety will be enhanced for everyone if personnel are aware of the concept of the “Bigger Picture” in the evaluation of events. Avoid becoming over focused on a single facet of any event. Overlooking or misinterpreting a single component of the emergency could influence the outcome of successive events.

What you overlook could kill you.

• The evaluation of surrounding incident factors should produce meaningful intelligence that can be factored into the development of a safe and effective incident action plan.
• The use of an incident action plan will provide a mechanism for adapting to changes on the fire scene and assist the fire officer in predicting the next step most likely to occur, providing time to deal with predicted change.

Experienced mountain climbers will periodically look around for landmarks, changes in their surroundings and unanticipated obstacles. Climbers are constantly evaluating their environment in an effort to maximize their safety while increasing the likelihood that they will meet their strategic goals. They know that in a high altitude environment, changes can occur quickly.

Incident Commanders, Company Officers and Firefighters should also make periodic assessments of their surroundings and constantly monitor the changes in their environment. Our environment, like that of the mountain climber is subject to rapid and dramatic changes that can be anticipated if we take the time to look at the “bigger picture”. Look ahead, look behind and look up once in a while.

Mike Scott

Kent Fire Department